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Abstract 
Political socialization affects the development of young people’s attitudes in post-conflict 
societies. Political socialization may support a movement toward positive intergroup relations, or 
it may influence the perpetuation of intergroup tensions and divisions. In the context of Vukovar, 
Croatia, political socialization, for youth growing up in a post-conflict community, involves 
learning about social relations, including relational power and group status within a multi-ethnic 
community. The current study examines experiences of political socialization in this context. 
Qualitative data from ten focus groups, conducted among 11-, 13-, and 15-year-olds, mothers, 
and fathers of Serb and Croat ethnicity, are analyzed using the constant comparative method. 
Results indicate a belief in the importance of parents, peers, schools, and the media in the 
development of youth’s political orientations, specifically related to intergroup relations. These 
attitudes are reflected in the lived realities of youth as political actors through their opinions 
toward intergroup interactions, their experiences of intergroup contact and conflict, and their 
beliefs about and recommendations for integrated education. Although some avoided any 
discussion of war, focus group participants’ predominant perspective reflected beliefs that the 
political socialization of youth operated to preserve intergroup tensions and division in Vukovar. 
The paper concludes with a number of policy and intervention implications. 
  Keywords: political socialization, intergroup relations, ethnic conflict, children, youth, Croatia 
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1. The Political Socialization of Youth in a Post-Conflict Community 
 Nearly 100% of today’s civil wars are characterized by ethnic conflict (UNICEF, 2009). 
In this increasingly prevalent context of ethno-political violence, young people are among those 
most greatly affected (Barber, 2009). Youth are impacted directly and indirectly by political 
violence, as combatants, as actors caught in the crossfire, or as witnesses to devastating loss and 
massive destruction (Cairns, 1996). The impact of political conflict on youth, however, extends 
beyond the cessation of violence and the signing of a peace agreement. Maturing and developing 
in post-accord contexts, youth are affected by environments of persistent tension and division 
(Cummings et al., 2011). 
 This study explores the interpersonal and societal dynamics that facilitate or inhibit 
positive intergroup relations for a generation born after mass atrocity. Specifically, it focuses on 
the lived realities of political socialization, or the ways in which one develops political 
orientations by learning about socially-relevant community relations. In a setting of intergroup 
divide, this approach to political socialization may help to understand the development of 
youth’s attitudes toward and behaviors in intergroup interactions (Sapiro, 2004), in particular 
how political messages transmitted by key actors relate to whether young people disrupt or 
maintain the status quo. Though studies have focused primarily on the impact of political 
violence on youth’s individual psychological, particularly psychopathological, functioning 
(Barber, 2009), it is important to examine the broader effects of conflict on youth’s intergroup 
attitudes and behaviors. For example, young people are socialized into politics, and multiple 
layers of their social ecology are active in the development of their political orientations 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1977). In this context, youth may shift their identities and social roles to 
destabilize or build peace (Kosic & Tauber, 2010b; McEvoy-Levy, 2006). In an environment 
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such as Vukovar, Croatia, where ethno-political tensions are salient, and societal reconciliation 
has yet to take root (Kosic & Tauber, 2010a; 2010b), processes of political socialization among 
youth may determine the future of intergroup relations and inter-ethnic harmony. 
1.1. The City of Vukovar: A Case Study of a Divided Community  
 Vukovar is a city in Croatia that lies along the Danube River on the border with Serbia. It 
is a city of approximately 27,700 inhabitants with a 57% Croat and 35% Serb population 
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Following Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991, 
the ethnic violence that waged during the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia disrupted the social 
fabric of Vukovar. During this time, between 7,000 (according to Serb sources) and 14,500 
(according to Croatian sources) members of the Serb paramilitary forces, as well as 500 to 600 
Croatian defenders, were killed (Sebetovsky, 2002). Of those who fought to defend Vukovar, 
one third successfully escaped the city following Croatian surrender, while those remaining were 
captured and sent to Serbian concentration camps (Sebetovsky, 2002). The destruction of trust 
during the war, alongside feelings of confusion and betrayal, caused the deterioration of 
intergroup relations between Croats and Serbs (Ajdukoviü & ýorkalo, 2004; Sekuliü, Massey, & 
Hodson, 2006). 
 Vukovar today represents a divided society. Political policies of ethnic separation 
permeate social institutions in an effort to safeguard minority rights (ýorkalo et al., 2004). As 
young people grow up in a context of tension and conflict, and are separated from their peers of 
different ethnicities, elders worry that conflict and the “ethnicization” of everyday life will 
continue into the future (ýorkalo Biruški, 2012). Young people in Vukovar have no experience 
of an integrated community, and thus, cannot recall a city characterized by harmonious 
intergroup relations and inter-ethnic friendships (Ajdukoviü & ýorkalo Biruški, 2008). 
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Exploration of the political socialization of young people in such an environment is critical to 
understanding the perpetuation of tension and violence in Vukovar and to efforts toward the 
establishment of peace in the region. 
1.2. Political Socialization 
 Almond and Verba’s (1963) The Civic Culture provided the original theoretical 
justification for the study of political socialization as a process by which a political culture could 
be developed. Hyman’s (1959) Political Socialization offered a more micro-level approach and 
defined political socialization as an individual’s learning of social patterns associated with 
his/her societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society. In the context of 
Vukovar, political socialization involves learning about social relations, including relational 
power and group status within a multi-ethnic community. The concept of political socialization 
offers a framework for understanding the origins of orientations that are politically-consequential 
among adults, whether concerning politics specifically or intergroup relations in settings of 
ethnic divide (Sapiro, 2004; Sears & Brown, 2013). 
 Although some theories conceive of political socialization as “society’s modeling of the 
child to some a priori model, usually one perpetuating the status quo” (Kinder & Sears, 
1985:714), other conceptualizations leave space for action that disrupts current norms 
(Kuterovac-Jagodiü, 2000; Langton, 1969). Adopting Hyman’s micro-level approach to political 
socialization, related to intergroup relations, this study investigates two questions: 1) Are 
political socialization processes relevant to supporting or disrupting the current system of 
politically-relevant social relations? 2) Is the transmission of information deliberate? These 
questions inform the examination of the intentionality of political socialization between youth 
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and relevant agents, and the lived realities of young people’s attitudes toward and behaviors in 
intergroup relations. 
 Theoretical foundations of political socialization identify its prime agents to be parents, 
peer groups, schools, and the media. Parents are primary transmitters of social norms and 
political orientations (Verkuyten, 2002), as well as of prejudicial attitudes (Rodríguez-García & 
Wagner, 2009). In an environment where ethnic conflict is high, parents play a powerful 
socialization role (Aboud & Amato, 2001), though their influence on the development of youth’s 
political or intergroup attitudes is rarely deliberate (Kosic & Livi, 2012). Parental influence is 
often manifested through indirect forms, such as overhearing adult conversations, asking 
questions about political issues, and listening to stories about national history (Kuterovac-
Jagodiü, 2000). Moreover, a youth’s own political interest and search for meaning is critical; 
young people are active participants, rather than passive recipients of political socialization 
(Sears & Brown, 2013), and parental accounts may be accentuated by other forms of social 
memory, or the shared generational narrative of a people (Cairns & Roe, 2003). These collective 
narratives may be woven into, or provide the backdrop for, family’s stories of survival during 
conflict (Hammack, 2010). 
 Peers, educational settings, and the media also play roles in the political socialization of 
young people (Langton, 1969), but are often filtered by parental influences. For example, parents 
may direct their children’s friendships and dating relationships (Munniksma, Flache, Verkuyten, 
& Veenstra, 2012). They select the schools their children attend, and they engage with media 
sources alongside their children, explaining political messages distributed to children through 
documentaries and news programming (McDevitt, 2006). Despite the primary role that parents 
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play, peer interactions, education systems, and media messages function to scaffold upon 
parental influence as youth develop (Kuterovac-Jagodiü, 2000). 
 Peer groups may transmit or reinforce the culture of the wider society or foster behaviors 
that contradict these values. They provide a social system in which individuals learn new 
behaviors and attitudes (Langton, 1969), potentially influencing the development of political 
attitudes (Dubow, Huesmann & Boxer, 2009), as well as reinforcing learned political behaviors 
(Dishion, Andrews, & Crosby, 1995). Such associations might exacerbate the negative impact of 
exposure to ethno-political violence among young people or operate to mitigate negative 
stereotypes and political orientations (Dubow et al., 2009). As young people in Vukovar 
encounter peers of different ethnicities in educational and in other social settings, processes of 
political socialization are at work. 
 Schools also serve as agents of political socialization in their capacity to instill political 
beliefs formally through conscious, planned instruction, as well as informally through 
inadvertent, casual experiences in the school environment. Specific political curricula, as well as 
coursework pertaining to contemporary social debates, influence young people’s understanding 
of political issues (Kuterovac-Jagodiü, 2000). Schools can, furthermore, validate the attitudes 
and behavior patterns developed in the family context, as well as foster the creation of new 
political orientations (Langton, 1969; Tolley, 1973). 
 For youth in divided societies, education is pivotal to political socialization, serving as a 
forum for fostering or diminishing intergroup tension (Hayes & McAllister, 2009; McGlynn, 
Niens, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2004). Although Croatia has a long history of minority schooling, 
the separate education of Serb and Croat children, following the war, is viewed as socially and 
politically divisive (Ajdukoviü & ýorkalo Biruški, 2008). This system, guaranteed by the 1995 
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Erdut Agreement,2 is characterized by the offering of subjects in ethnically-distinctive languages. 
Intended to last for five years, so as to provide a period in which alternative minority education 
options could be negotiated, ethnically-separated education continues today; only in 2006 were 
Croat and Serb children allowed to attend separate, but concurrent, classes in the same building. 
Previously, all classes were held in ethnically-separated shifts (half-days) or different buildings. 
With a strong social norm not to associate with the ‘other’ in public, moreover, children rarely 
socialize with the out-group outside of the classroom (Ajdukoviü & ýorkalo Biruški, 2008). 
Consequently, separate schools in Vukovar limit inter-ethnic contacts among peers, reinforce 
negative inter-ethnic behaviors and attitudes (ýorkalo Biruški & Ajdukoviü, 2007), and shape the 
political socialization of youth.  
 In addition to family, peers, and schools, media plays a significant role in the political 
socialization of youth (Atkin & Gantz, 1978; Conway, Wyckoff, Feldbaum, & Ahern, 1981; 
Tolley, 1973). Functioning as a source of information about political issues, the media has been 
shown to be associated with both political knowledge and public affairs interest for young people 
(Atkin & Gantz, 1978; Conway et al. 1981). Electronic sources of media, in particular, are highly 
effective as agents of political socialization (Simon & Merrill, 1997). In Vukovar, media is often 
viewed as opportunistic in its coverage of ethnic tensions and the memorialization of past 
atrocities (Ajdukoviü & ýorkalo Biruški, 2008; Sekuliü et al., 2006). These forms of 
communication may relate to the preservation of social memory and the interaction of family and 
collective narrative about the conflict. This perspective suggests important implications for the 
interpretation of media as an agent of political socialization in Vukovar, particularly toward 
2 At the end of the war in Croatia, Serbian and Croatian representatives, with international support, signed the Erdut 
Agreement which included provisions for the protection for minority rights, such as education. By separating the 
youth immediately after the war, the schooling system also functioned to prevent possible conflicts between the two 
groups of children. It should be noted that prior to the war, children were enrolled in the same classes offered in 
Croatian (ýorkalo Biruški & Ajdukoviü, 2007).  
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explaining how young people accumulate information about political issues.  
1.3. Current Study 
The first aim of this study is to understand the varying roles of critical agents and the 
nature of the political attitudes they transmit in the political socialization of youth in Vukovar. 
The second aim is to describe youths’ lived realities of political socialization – the beliefs 
participants have about how young people in Vukovar disrupt and maintain the status quo. In an 
environment such as Vukovar, youth are believed to operate as important “political actors,” 
functioning both as potential threats to peace and as critical peacebuilding resources with 
significant levels of agency (McEvoy-Levy, 2006). Their attitudes and behaviors are critical to 
the re-establishment of harmonious relations and to sustainable peacebuilding in Croatia. 
2. Method 
2.1. Design 
 This study utilized qualitative data from focus groups to explore what is considered to be 
the status quo by the participants (Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010). Focus groups are appropriate 
for research that aims to understand collective experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Frankland 
& Bloor, 1998). They strike a balance between informal talk and structured interviews (Puchta & 
Potter, 2004) and enable the discovery of emergent themes and the rich illustration of 
participants’ experiences (Burgess, Ferguson, & Hollywood, 2007). The use of focus groups in 
this study allowed for a robust analysis of the lived realities of political socialization in Vukovar 
and a culturally-sensitive understanding of the collective experiences of Croats and Serbs. 
2.2. Participants 
 Participants were selected following a purposeful sampling frame, which maximizes 
within-case variation (White & McBurney, 2010). That is, focus groups were designed to assess 
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various ages of youth during important developmental and social transitions, as well as parental 
perspectives (see Table). Given the importance of ethnicity in this context, recruitment aimed to 
have a balance of Croat and Serb participants. Overall, ten focus group discussions were 
conducted; each group consisted of 5 to 9 participants (total N = 66; 46.87% Croat, 53.03% Serb) 
and was homogenous by Croat/Serb ethnicity. Parent focus groups included fathers (n=12) and 
mothers (n=12) of similarly aged students, but whose children were not participating in the 
study; both single-parent (12.5%) and two-parent (74%) families were included (12.5% of 
parents did not report marital status). Two focus groups (1 Croat, 1 Serb) were conducted with 
11-year old (n=13), 13-year olds (n=14), and 15-year olds (n=15) and only one young person 
from a given family was allowed to participate. This age range was selected because youth were 
aware of the social distinctions of interest, but did not have direct war experience, allowing for 
analysis of intergenerational and age-related differences among youth and parents who had 
differing levels of exposure to ethno-political violence. 
2.3. Procedures and Data Collection 
In May of 2010, a team of professors and graduate field assistants from the University of 
Zagreb facilitated ten focus groups in Vukovar, Croatia. Focus group moderators were of 
Croatian ethnic background; however, their previous experience of working in the same 
community facilitated trusting and open relations with participants from both backgrounds. 
Participants were recruited through local community contacts and each focus group lasted 
approximately sixty to ninety minutes and were recorded and transcribed verbatim by the 
graduate field assistants and translated into English by the focus group moderators. Focus groups 
were conducted in a semi-structured interview format following an interview schedule, which 
included a series of catalyst questions and follow-up prompts (Smith & Dunworth, 2003; see 
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Appendix). Questions for the interview schedule were drawn extensively from prior research and 
underwent pilot testing in another divided city in Croatia. The treatment of participants was in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association, and the study 
was approved by the Institutional Review Boards at all participating universities. For this paper, 
proper names have been removed to ensure the anonymity of participants.3 
2.4. Data Analysis Procedures 
 The constant comparative method allows for systematic and explicit coding through 
sensitive and reliable inspection. Adapted for team analysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maykut & 
Morehouse, 1994), the constant comparative method follows an inductive approach. 
 First, the research team works together to unitize data into chunks of meaning (Maykut & 
Morehouse, 1994). Identifying phrases that closely capture the essence of the participants’ words 
are applied to each unit (Smith & Dunworth, 2003).  Next, during continuous refinement and 
inductive category coding the team reviews each unit, grouping them together into broader, 
provisional categories (Smith & Dunworth, 2003). As units accumulate, a rule for inclusion is 
created that functions as the basis for including or excluding units of meaning from a provisional 
category (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Finally, once all of the data have been assigned to a 
category, the team explores patterns across categories and generates comprehensive review of 
differences and similarities across categories to highlights emergent themes. 
 Data analysis was conducted by a graduate student and a BA-level research assistant with 
a background in political psychology, who participated in all stages of data analysis and agreed 

3 We assigned a six-digit focus group identification (ID) to each youth speaker to indicate the ethnicity, age, sex, and 
participant number (e.g.C-11-M-04 indicates that the speaker is an 11-year-old male Croat). For parents, we 
assigned a five-digit ID to indicate ethnicity, gender, and participant number (e.g.S-FA-53 indicates that the speaker 
is a Serb father). 
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on the final categories and overarching themes (Muldoon, McLaughlin, & Trew, 2007). Final 
results were shared with all co-investigators. 
3. Results 
 The results focus on: (1) the agents of political socialization and the nature of their 
messages for young people, and (2) the lived realities of youth as political actors, demonstrating 
the effects of political socialization by maintaining or challenging the status quo of intergroup 
tension and division in Vukovar. Participants noted that explicit messages of political 
socialization were conveyed by four primary agents: parents, peers, schools, and the media. 
3.1. Agents of Political Socialization 
 3.1.1. Parents. Focus groups revealed a belief in the importance of parents as agents of 
socialization, operating in closest proximity to young people’s functioning. Participants often 
claimed that youth nationalism results from upbringing in the home. They justified these claims 
through further elaborations of explicit parent-child interactions pertaining to: (a) the war and (b) 
ethnicity.  
3.1.1.1. The war. Two ways in which parents claimed to approach the topic of the war 
with their children emerged from the data: discussions of the broader war context, and narratives 
about family experiences during the war. Croat and Serb parents reported engaging in different 
patterns of broad discussion with their children. Serb parents, in particular, questioned the need 
to explain to their children how the war situation really was, and often withheld their 
perspectives. As one Serb father noted: “I found it interesting that my kids didn’t really know 
who they are; we never really talked about it; like, it’s better that they don’t know. And until they 
became aware of everything, these subjects revolving around the war and everything that 
happened, I somehow always avoided mentioning it in front of them” [S-FA-53]. Croat parents, 
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on the other hand, told their children never to forget the war and the ways in which Croats, as a 
group, suffered. One Croat mother described such interactions that she has with her children: “I 
didn’t lose anyone in the war… but I like to explain it to the children and I like to remind them, 
every year on the day Vukovar fell, ‘Children, don’t ever forget this…” [C-MO-57]. 
Parents also claimed to share information with their children about their personal and 
family’s experiences and traumas suffered during the war. Though Serb parents reported that 
they avoided explaining to their children the broader situation of the war, they noted that they 
often told to their children personal stories of fleeing from Vukovar and other negative wartime 
experiences. As one Serb mother stated: “My father-in-law ended up in… for three months, in a 
concentration camp, together with the warriors. And he told [my son] everything about it, what 
he lived through. I told him what I lived through” [S-MO-65]. Croat parents claimed to offer 
detailed accounts of defending Vukovar during the war and escaping from the city, including 
stories of imprisonment and the loss of loved ones. Through macro-narratives and personal 
family experiences, participants expressed a belief that Serb and Croat parents use the war to 
communicate messages about political life in Vukovar to their children. 
 Both parents and youth reported that many of the conversations about the war were 
initiated by children themselves. A handful of young people noted that they were not interested 
in learning about the war or did not want to talk about it; within this group, there was no pattern 
of avoidance by age or ethnicity. On the other hand, many youth participants engaged in a 
“search for meaning,” in which they reported to solicit information from their parents often 
following exposure to political messages from peers, schools, and the media. As one Serb father 
stated of his son: “Well, we talk when we reach a common ground, meaning while watching TV 
and something like that is shown, and then a question is raised. So [my son] asks, we are Serbs, 
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‘Well okay dad, in which army were you?’ So something must be said, and when you hear ‘the 
Serbian army,’ ‘the paramilitary’… and now you have to explain… Delving deeply into the 
question of who caused the war, who started… for me it is important that he learns specific 
things directly” [S-FA-54]. One Croat 13-year-old explained: “[My father] was in a 
concentration camp and I asked him what it was like there and… And I was interested in that, 
what it was like there…He told me they were beating them all of the time and so” [C-13-F-16]. 
This participant described her interactions with her father, a Croatian war defender4 and soldier 
in Vukovar, and how she prompted him to share stories and information about the war. 
 3.1.1.2. Ethnicity. Young people reported that they learned about their ethnic identity 
through interactions with their parents. Several parent participants described an initial lack of 
understanding about ethnic differences among their children. They claimed that their children did 
not know about ethnic differences, and/or were too young to understand them. For example, one 
Serb mother stated: “In our kindergarten, there was a separate entrance for Croats, and a 
separate entrance for Serbs. And the children couldn't understand why they had to enter there, 
and we had to enter here” [S-MO-65]. She claimed that children did not yet understand the 
implications of their ethnic membership.  
 Accordingly, participants noted that many young people began to learn about their 
ethnicity through discussions with their parents. Participants reported that young people, in many 
cases, initiated such conversations so as to seek explanation or clarification from their parents. 
For example, one Serb mother recalled a particular ethnically-relevant conversation in which she 
participated with her daughter: “[My daughter] asked me ‘What am I?’ She knows we celebrate 

4War defenders were those that fought as members of the Croatian forces during the Battle of Vukovar, either as 
soldiers in the Croatian national army, officers in the Vukovar police force, or as residents of Vukovar and 
surrounding cities who volunteered to protect their city (Sebetovsky, 2002).
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Slava5 and other such customs, but she wasn't aware of the nationality... Only recently, when she 
was in fourth or fifth grade, did we explain some things to her” [S-MO-64]. Through this 
recollection, the Serb mother illustrated the extent to which she engaged in discussions with her 
daughter about matters of ethnicity, as well as her daughter’s curiosity about ethnic group 
differences. One Croat mother also described a conversation that she held with her daughter 
regarding matters of ethnicity: “I asked [my daughter] whether there was any difference between 
[name omitted], who was one such person [a Serb], and me, as a woman, as a person. She said 
there wasn’t. Only, ‘[name omitted] says mleko, and we say mlijeko” [C-MO-58]. In this 
example, the Croat mother offered an example of her daughter’s understanding of ethnic 
differences through the pronunciation of “milk” in the Serbian and Croatian languages. 
 3.1.2. Peers. Focus group participants noted that peers were important agents of political 
socialization for young people. Peers were believed, by participants, to become increasingly 
relevant as agents of socialization as youth got older and spent more time with their friends and 
outside of their homes. However, participants reported that youth continued to turn to their 
parents for explanation or clarification of ethnic matters brought up during conversations with 
their peers. For instance, one Croat 13-year-old described the discussions that he has with his 
friends about the war: “Well sometimes when I talk with my friends, who are of Serbian 
nationality, then sometimes we debate about [the war], but we never argue, we just talk normally 
and then I ask my mum or dad” [C-13-M-67]. This participant offered an example of the 
interactions that he has with his parents following conversations with his peers on ethno-political 
matters. He illustrated not only in the socializing influence of his peers, but also in the interactive 

5 A family tradition of the Serbian Orthodox church in which Serbs ritually glorify the patron saint of their family on 
that saint’s feast day (Gavriloviü, 2003).
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capacity of his parents, in response to his peers, to shape the development of his political 
attitudes. 
 3.1.3. Schools. According to focus group participants, educational settings play a key role 
in the political socialization of youth, influencing the political attitudes and behaviors of young 
people through curriculum about the war and through the organization of commemoration 
services. Reports of planned classroom instruction about the war demonstrated variation by 
ethnicity and age. Such instruction, according to participants, was evident primarily among Croat 
youth, and not among Serb youth, and among 15-year-old participants, but not among 11- or 13-
year-olds. As one Serb stated: “It’s not mentioned in school” [S-15-M-34]. Other Serb 
participants could not recall a specific instance in which the subject matter was discussed in the 
school context. Croat youth, on the other hand, articulated the ways in which political issues 
were broached at school. One Croat 15-year-old described the kind of information that his 
teacher presents to him in the classroom: “Well nothing, like, the war, basic information, he puts 
on a song about the war, I mean, he like puts on Thompson6, about what happened in Vukovar” 
[C-15-M-32]. He went on to describe how he learned about ethnic relations through classroom 
instruction: “You also learn it in History class… We [Croats and Serbs] weren’t always best 
friends” [C-15-M-32]. Though 11- and 13-year-old participants did not claim to learn about the 
war in school, they still described their education in Croatian history. One 11-year-old Croat 
stated: “In fourth grade we studied about Yugoslavia and Franjo Tuÿman7 a little” [C-11-M-03]. 
Statements such as these acknowledge a belief that schools in Vukovar enable young people of 
different ages to accumulate knowledge about political matters, which may affect their 
subsequent reasoning about political issues. 
6 A Croat nationalist pop singer. 
7 The first president of Croatia. 
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 Beyond classroom instruction, schools were identified by participants to function as 
agents of political socialization through the organization of commemoration services on 
November 18th, “The Day of the Fall of Vukovar,” the anniversary of the day that Croatian 
defenders in Vukovar surrendered to Serb forces. Though Croat students reported participating in 
school-organized commemoration services on November 18th, Serb students claimed not to 
attend.8 One 11-year-old Croat described the school-sponsored commemoration services: 
The other day, when it was The Day of the Fall of Vukovar, we had a performance, so to 
say. I don't know, and then we took part in things, like recital, and we made some 
presentations. And so... the parents came to watch us, and then we went to the cemetery 
to light some candles. …. And later that day we went from the hospital to the cemetery, 
and we could see the candles we lit at Memorial sites in the city strongly associated with 
war [C-11-F-04]. 
This Croat youth illustrated her experiences on the day of commemoration and highlighted her 
visitation of key landmarks and monuments in Vukovar. She depicted the ways in which she 
believes that schools serve as agents of political socialization, specifically for Croat youth, by 
their organization of services that orient young people to the social context of the war.  
 3.1.4. Media. Finally, focus group participants established a belief that the media also 
serves as a critical agent in the political socialization of young people. Parents and youth 
reported that young people learn about the war and ethnic differences through television and 
through video documentaries. They claimed that media coverage of matters pertaining to the war 
and to ethnic differences is most prevalent around the commemoration of the Day of the Fall of 
Vukovar. As one Serb mother stated: “November 18th is approaching… That’s when it 
8 On November 18th, Serb students select not to attend school and do not participate in commemoration services so 
as to avoid tense intergroup encounters. Serb students are not prohibited from attending (Biro et al., 2004).
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happened. Chetniks9 did that. Chetniks. So, it’s a time of [media] bombardment, naturally. We’re 
all spending time in front of TV” [S-MO-65]. Two Croat mothers also described their children’s 
exposure to messages about the war during this period: 
[C-MO-59]: I think there is a lot of talk about war. Every year. Either this way, or 
through the movies and the TV...  
[C-MO-58]: That’s true. My little girl, last year we were watching TV on the day the Fall 
of Vukovar was commemorated, there were all those documentaries and everything. She 
wanted to go out, but I told her to sit tight and watch the program, saying it’s interesting, 
showing her some of the streets she might not recognize from the bombing. She told me, 
‘Mom, I already know all that. That was on TV before. I already saw it all.’ 
These mothers noted the political information that is disseminated via the media during the 
commemoration period in Vukovar.  
 Focus group participants reported that media contributed to the political socialization of 
youth not only directly, through explicit messages and footage, but also indirectly, through 
sparking interactions between young people and their parents during and after exposure to the 
material. One Serb father described such interactions with his son: “Sometimes we don’t talk 
about [the war] for days or something on the TV…stimulates a conversation about something. 
He asks, so I reply,” the father stated [S-FA-52]. In examining these interactions, it is important 
to recognize the agency of youth; that is, young people search for meaning and engage with 
subjects of political relevance of their own will. 
3.2. Lived Realities of Political Socialization: Youth as Political Actors 

9 Chetniks were paramilitary Serb units that were responsible for mass executions of Croats. The term has 
derogative meaning in Croatia. 
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 Focus groups explored the ways in which youth function as socialized political actors – 
individuals with the capacity to contribute to societal reconstruction and reconciliation – in ways 
that served to maintain the status quo of intergroup tension and community division or to 
challenge the status quo and promote more positive intergroup relations. In these domains, youth 
were believed to demonstrate the effects of political socialization in their orientations toward 
intergroup interactions, their experiences of intergroup contact and conflict, and their opinions 
about and recommendations for integrated education. 
 3.2.1. Maintaining the status quo of intergroup tension. Through their reported 
attitudinal and behavioral dispositions toward intergroup interactions, youth demonstrated the 
capacity to maintain the status quo of intergroup tension and community division. For example, 
several young participants expressed preference for in-groups members and avoidance of out-
group members. “I just play with my peers, from my school, from my class,” said one 11-year-
old Croat [C-11-F-06]. “We're not really together, the Croats and the Serbs. Serbs spend more 
time among themselves. Our class… We don't want to get involved with anyone else,” said one 
11-year-old Serb [S-11-M-07]. Youth participants, furthermore, described their experiences of 
peer pressure not to cross ethnic lines for friendship or acquaintance. Several youth participants 
admitted that they must distance themselves from their cross-group friends, for fear of peer 
disdain. For example, one 13-year-old Serb stated: “I have a friend who’s almost my best friend 
from the Croatian shift and then the rest of her friends were telling her that how can she hang 
out with me, I’m Serbian, that my parents or something, someone related to me killed her folks 
and nonsense like that… Well, she distanced herself from me a bit since then. She said she 
doesn’t mind that I’m Serbian but she minds what they’ll say about her” [S-13-F-20]. In reports 
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such as these, participants described how youth demonstrated the effects of political socialization 
by acting in ways that preserve intergroup division. 
 Youth’s reported experiences of intergroup conflict were believed to perpetuate further 
intergroup tensions. Participants noted that intergroup conflict between Croats and Serbs took on 
several forms: non-physical threat, cyber and verbal conflict, low-level physical conflict, and 
more severe physical conflict. Many of these conflicts were claimed to revolve around the war 
and matters of ethnicity. One 13-year-old Serb described her experiences of intergroup conflict: 
“Nowadays the younger generations mostly in the Croatian shifts attack our folks. They tell us 
that we are Chetniks, that we murdered their parents” [S-13-F-19]. A 15-year-old Croat 
confirmed: “[We argue] about stupid things, and then offending on a national level starts” [C-
15-F-33]. As demonstrated in this statement, participants described how many intergroup 
conflicts between Croat and Serb youth originated as benign and relatively neutral, and then to 
escalate along ethno-political dimensions. Among older youth, reports emerged of more severe 
intergroup conflict. One 15-year-old Serb participant recalled: “A boy was attacked in a bus. 
There wasn't really any reason, just because he was a Croat. He sang songs, provocative ones, 
and this guy took a knife and I don't know. He did something to him. And the bus stopped. They 
called the police. And they went to court because of it” [S-15-F-38]. This incident, too, depicted 
a perception of the escalation of milder conflicts into more severe intergroup violence.  
 Finally, participants expressed that youth demonstrated the effects of political 
socialization through their attitudes toward integrated education, which maintained the status 
quo. Some youth argued that the schooling system should remain separated by ethnicity to 
prevent intergroup conflict. “I would argue with them constantly,” said one 15-year-old Serb [S-
15-M-37]. “It's better like this,” said an 11-year-old Croat, “Because the children would argue, 
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and fight, ‘these were better at war,’ ‘those gave in,’ ‘no, we were better’… I think that's how it 
would be” [C-11-F-04]. In this example, the participant explicitly mentioned the war as a 
justification for maintaining the current system of separation.  
 Youth participants also argued that schools should remain divided so as to foster the 
rights of each ethnic group to study their own culture and history, and in their own language, 
consistent with Croatian policies that seek to protect minority rights to an education (ýorkalo et 
al., 2004). One 13-year-old Serb claimed: “I think it’s good that we have Croatian and Serbian 
shifts because everyone can choose where they want to go, since everyone has their choice, their 
opinion and I respect that. Whatever school they choose to go, I respect that” [S-13-F-19]. 
Participants demonstrated their understanding of ethnic differences and the implications of these 
differences in the education system in a way that supports the status quo of intergroup division. 
 3.2.2. Challenging the status quo. On the other hand, focus groups also revealed a belief 
in the ways that youth disrupt the existing state of community relations through their orientations 
toward intergroup contact. Many youth participants, acknowledging the ethnic division into 
which they had been socialized, claimed to pursue friendships and relationships based on 
feelings of safety and good character, rather than on ethnic membership. “I play with both the 
Serbs and the Croats. It doesn't matter to me at all, this nationality thing,” stated one 11-year-
old Serb [S-11-M-07]. A 15-year-old Croat described her friendships with Serbs: “Yeah, as if 
they weren’t Serbian at all, we don’t consider this nationality so much, because, if we did – what 
would this town come to?” [C-15-F-28]. This participant explicitly addressed the negative effects 
of intergroup division and selected to overcome that division through personal relationships. 
 Participants also explained how youth disrupted the status quo through their intergroup 
interactions and behaviors. Focus group data reported the existence of cross-group friendships 
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outside of school, often resulting from youths’ participation in sports and extracurricular 
activities. One 15-year-old Croat stated: “Well I do hang out with Serbs…and some of them are 
good friends of mine” [C-15-M-30]. An 11-year-old Serb stated: “I've been practicing at a club 
where there are, how do I say this, a lot of Croats, for four years now… And now I've found my 
best friend among them” [S-11-F-09]. Croats and Serbs described the ways in which they 
overcome ethnic divides through cross-group interaction. 
 Finally, focus group data established a perception of youth as political actors, as youth 
expressed their attitudes toward and recommendations for integrated education in Vukovar. 
Youth participants maintained that they are open to integrated education because they believe 
that it would reduce intergroup conflicts, allow for cross-group friendships, and accelerate 
reconciliation between Croats and Serbs. “I don’t even like the fact that we are separated in 
shifts, Serbian/Croatian, it would be better if we were together, and those conflicts wouldn’t 
happen anymore, we’d all be equal,” stated a 13-year-old Serb [S-13-M-22]. In support of 
educational integration, two areas of recommendations to integrate the school system emerged: 
acceptance and reduced intergroup conflict, and Croatian curriculum with Serb-specific course 
options. Youth of both Croat and Serb ethnicities stated that they would be open to attending 
class with members of different ethnic groups as long as these individuals didn’t insult them; that 
an integrated school would be acceptable, “without the teasing and stuff” [C-11-M-02]. In 
addition, several of the youth participants, particularly those of Croat ethnicity, adopted a more 
assimiliationist view of integrated education. One Croat 15-year-old stated: “I think they 
shouldn’t have school in Serbian and in Croatian, because again it’s separation. They could’ve 
just put it, so, school’s in Croatian but there’s Serbian as an extra subject, which Serbs would 
take” [C-15-F-28]. Croat youth participants viewed the education system as necessarily 
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Croatian, yet allowed for Serbian course options in accordance with minority rights. Youth 
participants developed suggestions by which integrated education could be possible. By thinking 
beyond the current system of divided schooling, they demonstrated belief in their potential 
political agency and ability to change the status quo in Vukovar. 
4. Discussion 
 This study aimed to understand the varying roles that agents play in the political 
socialization of youth in Vukovar, Croatia. It sought to explore the nature and content of the 
politically-relevant attitudes being transmitted to youth, and the lived realities of youth as 
political actors. First, qualitative analyses revealed a belief in the importance of parents, peers, 
schools, and the media in the development of youth’s political attitudes. Second, youth 
participants demonstrated socialized political identities through their orientations toward 
intergroup interactions, their reported experiences of intergroup contact and conflict, and their 
opinions about integrated education. Despite some examples of questioning the status quo, the 
understanding among many participants was that youth recreate the political messages to which 
they are exposed during interactions with agents of socialization. Although some avoided any 
discussion of war, the focus group participants’ predominant perspective reflected an 
understanding that the political socialization of youth operated to preserve intergroup tensions in 
Vukovar. 
4.1. Agents of Political Socialization 
 Focus group members articulated the explicit influences of parents, peers, schools, and 
the media in the development of youth’s political orientations. In contrast to past research that 
suggests a non-significant correlation of parent-child ethnic attitudes (Aboud & Doyle, 1996), 
participants noted that parents are critical socialization agents through explicit discussions and 
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explanations of the war and ethnicity. Parents also responded to their children’s search for 
meaning following their children’s exposure to political messages from peers, schools, and the 
media. In the present study, parents were construed as filters through which political messages 
were processed by young people. They modified and reinforced the messages that were 
transmitted by other agents. 
 The explicit role of peers was less frequently mentioned during focus groups. Although 
some youth participants reported having discussions and debates with their peers about the war 
and topics pertaining to ethnicity, these examples were rare. This is consistent with the literature 
which suggests that many, though not all, youth remain politically uninterested during their 
adolescence (Kuhn, 2004). It is also possible that peer interactions might serve to reinforce 
already internalized political attitudes, rather than political behaviors and beliefs (Kuhn, 2004).
 Parents and young people explained how schools helped to mold youth as political actors 
through explicit discussion and instruction about the war and Croatian history. Past research has 
demonstrated the importance of educational settings for political socialization (Stringer et al., 
2010; Torney-Purta, 2002). In this sample, schools might be understood to be more relevant as 
agents of political socialization for Croats, in comparison to Serbs, and for older youth (age 15), 
in comparison to younger youth (ages 11 and 13). Though children in Vukovar begin to learn 
about Croatian history in fifth grade, they do not learn about the recent war until eighth grade 
(Vican & Milanovic Litre, 2006), when students are approximately 14-years-old. 
 The media, in the form of television and video documentaries, also shaped young 
people’s political attitudes, according to focus group participants. Though the media was 
described as transmitting directly messages to children and youth about the war, particularly 
around the Day of the Fall of Vukovar, parents often claimed to modify or reinforce these 
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messages. Children in our sample recalled frequently engaging with their parents in discussions 
during and after viewings of documentaries and political media programs. This is consistent with 
McDevitt’s (2006) model of developmental provocation, which illustrates the ways in which 
children initiate political conversations with their parents based on exposure to news media. 
4.2. Lived Realities of Political Socialization: Youth as Political Actors 
 Through assessment of the lived realities of youth’s political socialization, this study 
examined beliefs about how young people disrupt and maintain the status quo in the Croat and 
Serb communities of Vukovar, through their orientations toward intergroup interactions, their 
experiences of intergroup contact and conflict, and their attitudes toward integrated education. 
Previous research has suggested that youth, in comparison to adults, may have grander plans for 
change and may be less impeded by experience (Galtung, 2006); thus, they bear a greater 
capacity to disrupt the status quo. In the context of Vukovar, however, processes of political 
socialization transmit knowledge and experiences, which inhibit adults who, in turn, inhibit 
youth, thus diminishing the ability of young people to overturn the current socio-political trends. 
The “impressionable years” (Sears & Brown, 2013) of the study’s youth participants are shaped 
by ethnic division, ethnically-based power sharing, non-ambiguous messages on ethnic group 
status and other politically-relevant aspects of social relations which all determine (and reflect) 
political dynamics in the community. In this regard, even as reflected by their orientation 
towards intergroup interactions, playing with peers, and other mundane activities, youth are 
“actors” in a sense that they participate in following the “rules of the game” and thus help in 
maintaining the social order.  
 Though bearing the capacity to disrupt the status quo, young people more often 
maintained the ethnic division. For example, youth articulated instances of peer pressure not to 
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cross group lines and expressed fear of in-group reprisal and by their endorsement of out-group 
avoidance. Moreover, despite cross-group friendships through extra-curricular activities, they 
also claimed to engage in varying levels of intergroup conflict, such as escalation of neutral 
conflicts along ethnic lines. Toward this end, opinions about integrated education reflected 
further division. Many youth argued that divided classrooms prevent intergroup conflict and 
protect each group’s right to learn their own culture, history, and language. Among several 
students who expressed openness to integrated education, qualifying statements especially by 
Croat youth, arose. Overall, young people did not recreate messages that could mitigate 
intergroup tension. Instead, with very few exceptions, the comments of parents and young people 
indicated a perspective that youth re-enact political messages from parents, peers schools, and 
the media, through their attitudes and behaviors that serve to preserve intergroup tension in 
Vukovar.  
 The findings of this study are relevant for theory and scholarship on intergroup relations, 
particularly in contexts of protracted violence and post-accord peacebuilding. First, this study 
supports the claim that political socialization is relevant to maintaining the current state of 
affairs, though it leaves open the notion that the transmission of political information, for the 
purposes of supporting the status quo, is deliberate. Second, in accordance with 
Bronfenbrenner’s social ecological framework (1977), this study revealed multiple layers of the 
child’s social ecology to be active in the development of his/her political orientations during the 
individual’s search for meaning. Finally, although young people expressed lived realities of 
political socialization in ways that operate to maintain the status quo, the data also revealed 
youths’ desires and recommendations for more positive intergroup relations. Given this 
understanding, it is important to discover the factors that might influence such positive outlooks, 
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN A POST-CONFLICT COMMUNITY

27
particularly when it appears that parents, peers, schools, and the media are socializing young 
people in an opposing way. 
4.3. Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite the strengths of ten focus groups including multiple reporters and youth of 
various developmentally-relevant age groups from both Croat and Serb communities, this study 
faced some methodological limitations. First, mothers, fathers, and youth in our sample were not 
related as parent-child triads. Therefore, it was impossible to confirm the direct effects of parents 
as agents of socialization or to associate particular parental characteristics with the development 
of young people’s attitudes. Second, as mothers and fathers participated in separate focus groups, 
this study was not able to examine the degree of consensus between mother-father dyads. Third, 
although focus groups are appropriate for gaining understanding of contextually-relevant 
concepts related to collective experiences, having advantages over individual interviews void of 
the interactional nature across participants (Barbour, 2007), they may also be constrained by 
“group think,” peer effects, or other micro-dynamics within the discussion (Frankland & Bloor, 
1998; Muldoon et al., 2007; Waterton & Wynne, 1998). Finally, the qualitative focus group 
approach may be strengthened when complemented by mixed or quantitative methods, which 
may also allow for greater sample size and generalizablility. 
 This study has found that youth hold attitudes and engage in behaviors that affect the 
maintenance of intergroup tension in Vukovar. Future research may seek to complement the 
beliefs presented in this study with more direct evidence of the role of the media, the school 
curriculum and ethos, and children’s direct experiences of intergroup contact. An analysis of 
parental views regarding changes in youth attitudes and behaviors over time would also be 
valuable. 
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 This study poses implications for policy and intervention. Prevention and intervention 
approaches should attend to the influence of parents, educating them on the ways in which they 
transmit political messages to their children and the effects of such messages. Policymakers 
would be advised, furthermore, to address the situation of separated education in Vukovar as 
divisive and challenging to intergroup relations in the community. As youth are drawn to media 
for news and information, media personnel must strive for the un-biased coverage of political 
events. 
 Finally, the creation of outlets through which young people can function as positive 
political actors and engage in the social reconstruction of Vukovar may contribute to post-accord 
peacebuilding. Political involvement may have positive psychological effects for children in 
situations of violence and intergroup tension (McEvoy-Levy, 2006). Moreover, youth can be 
highly effective agents of social change (Helsing, Kirlic, McMaster, & Sonnenschein, 2006). For 
this reason, it is useful to consider how to empower young people and the positive effect that 
they might have in their communities in settings of protracted ethnic tension and political 
violence. 
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Table: Composition of Focus Groups 
 
Age Croat Serb 
11-years-old n=6 (50% male; 50% female)  n=7 (42.86% male; 57.14% female) 
13-years-old n=6 (50% male; 50% female)  n=8 (50% male; 50% female) 
15-years-old n=6 (50% male; 50% female)  n=9 (55.56% male; 44.44% female) 
Mothers n=6 (M = 42.33, SD = 7.34)  n=6 (M = 40.0, SD = 6.42 ) 
Fathers n=7 (M = 41.14, SD = 4.95)  n=5 (M = 42.6, SD = 3.65 ) 
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Appendix 
1. Perception of threat/safety in the community (non-ethnically based) and experience with 
non-ethnically based violence 
1.1. How is it for you to live in Vukovar? Is it safe to be outside at night? Do you think that 
something bad might happen to you when you are returning home at night? 
1.2. Has anyone ever threatened you with a weapon, beaten you up, or taken something that 
belonged to you, so that you were afraid that you will get hurt?  
2. Perception of ethnically related threat 
2.1. How do your parents feel if you spend time with Serbs?  
2.2. How do Serbs behave when they meet Croats?  
3. Experiences with interethnic violence  
3.1. Have you ever had unpleasant experiences with Serbs?  
3.2. Have you seen someone from the Serb community threaten with a weapon or beat up a 
Croat? 
4. Perception of interethnic tensions and relations  
Current: 
4.1. Are there any differences when you spend time with your Serb and Croat peers?  
4.2. Could you think about the last time when you talked with your parents about relations 
between Croats and Serbs in Vukovar?  
4.3. Do you spend time with Serbs in your school? 
4.4. Could you think of some examples that describe relations between Croats and Serbs in 
Vukovar today?  
Past:
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4.5. Do you ever talk about what happened to your family during the war?  
Future:
4.6. Do you think Croats and Serbs in Vukovar can reconcile? 
 
